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Individuals who are charged for traditional crimes are substantially more likely to plead
guilty than individuals who are charged under the same statutes but who are officially
involved in terrorism (Smith & Damphousse, 1998). Relying on a structural–contextual
theory framework, a quantitative analysis not only confirmed that terrorists plead
guilty more often than traditional offenders but that the defendant’s age and number
of counts in the indictment are important predictors. Directions for future research are
suggested.
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Academicians, politicians, and lawyers have long debated the merits of plea bar-gaining, and most studies have had at least one common thread—the percentage
of defendants pleading guilty in federal and state criminal cases has remained sig-
nificant, typically higher than 80% (e.g., Champion, 1989; Smith, 1994).1 All court
actors have incentives to negotiate dispositions rather than take cases to trial because
“trials are slow and unpredictable, they require prodigious investment of resources
and preparation, and they produce one winner and one loser, with no room for com-
promise” (Worden, 1990, p. 335).
Research conducted by Smith (1994) and by Smith and Damphousse (1996, 1998)
revealed that terrorists plead guilty at half the percentage of traditional criminal
defendants. Indeed, terrorists are unlike traditional offenders in many fundamen-
tal ways. Terrorists do not fit the typical demographic profile of common criminals;
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terrorists are motivated by political or social goals instead of pecuniary ones; and their
behavior is significantly different from traditional offenders following arrest and
indictment—including a much lower plea rate. To address this issue, it is important to
look at plea bargain literature in an effort to better understand crime-specific pleading
patterns.
There is a wealth of literature concerning the merits of negotiated pleas, but by com-
parison, there has been little research dedicated toward an understanding of the theoret-
ical underpinnings of plea bargains. To some, the problem inherent in plea bargaining
is the illusiveness of the decision-making process (Harris & Springer, 1984; Lagoy,
Senna, & Siegel, 1976). The existing research has generally emerged from two direc-
tions: (a) studies focused directly on factors that affect decision making and (b) studies
that measure the effect of legal and extra-legal variables on the plea-bargain rate.2
Decision-Centered Studies
Evolving from attempts to understand the illusive nature of plea decision making,
decision-centered methodologies are the product of data obtained by conducting inter-
views and surveys, distributing questionnaires, and engaging in participant observation
that is directly focused on the perceptions of judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense
counsel (Buckle & Buckle, 1977; Heumann, 1977; Mather, 1979; McAllister, 1990;
Meyer & Gray, 1997; Parnas, 1979; Worden, 1990; Utz, 1977). An example of this
approach is Emmelman’s recursive decision-making theory, wherein she examines the
interplay of numerous variables among three activities that the study uses to define the
decision-making process (Emmelman, 1996). According to recursive decision making,
the first activity involves defense attorneys who estimate the value of a case by decid-
ing whether it might be won or lost at trial. Estimates result in three tentative conclu-
sions: Many cases should be plea bargained immediately; some should proceed
further; others should go to trial. The defense attorney’s tacit understanding of the
value of a case actively structures his or her negotiation techniques, and it is the
process of negotiating the terms of a plea that forms the second activity in recursive
decision making. The final activity requires the attorney to counsel the defendant and
decide on a course of action. The defense attorney repeatedly engages in these activi-
ties until reaching a settlement or until the case is resolved by trial (Emmelman, 1996).
Harris and Springer (1984) evaluate similar studies (Lagoy et al., 1976; Newman,
1966; White, 1971) and conclude that prior research involved a shotgun approach of
looking at too many variables leading to deficiencies in theoretical reliability.
Alternatively, they build on research by Simon (1976) and suggest a model that
focuses on decision making as a two-person game between an agent for the state—
the prosecutor—and an agent for the defendant—the defense attorney (Harris &
Springer, 1984).
Harris and Springer (1984) identify four factors that shape decision making: the evi-
dentiary strength of the defendant’s case, which involves court actors evaluating the
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reliability of physical evidence and witnesses;3 the seriousness of the crime charged;
the defendant’s criminal record; and extra-legal variables such as gender and race.
They argue that plea negotiations are not the result of carefully balancing multiple
pieces of information, but rather the result of constrained negotiations, dominated by
rules of thumb developed by both agents (Harris & Springer, 1984). Their analysis of
California robbery and burglary cases leads them to conclude that plea bargaining is
dominated by standard operating procedures and the study finds that prior criminal
history has the strongest effect with a negative relationship on whether a case is set-
tled by plea bargain (Harris & Springer, 1984)
A study of prosecutors in Georgia Superior Courts asserts that plea bargaining
rates are dependent on the politics and attitudes that exist within individual jurisdic-
tions, rather than on the resources available to prosecutors (Worden, 1990).4 This
study asserts that prosecutors are more willing to negotiate a plea when they exert
some impact on sentence outcomes, suggesting that prosecutors are not as likely to
negotiate a settlement when judges routinely follow the presentence investigation
recommendations on sentence length rather than the prosecutors’ recommendations.
Prosecutors’ policies toward plea bargaining are shaped by the perceived needs of
the community—in jurisdictions where crime is a genuine problem, plea bargaining
policies become more restrictive (Worden, 1990).
Other research on prosecutorial discretion has explored a number of factors that
affect plea bargain rates (Alschuler, 1975; Champion 1987, 1989; Frazier & Bock,
1982; Klein, 1976). Many prosecutors have gathered socioeconomic background
information on various defendants, including Internal Revenue Service information
(Champion, 1987). Some prosecutors gather data on defendants’ criminal history,
marital status, and their ability to obtain quality legal representation (Champion,
1989; LaFave, 1978; Lagoy, Hussey, & Kramer, 1979; Mather, 1979). Studies
revealed that 60% of prosecutors would intensify the punitive severity of a plea offer
if the crime was violent and committed against persons, but notably, only 34% of
prosecutors would intensify punitive severity when they believed they had strong
evidence (Champion, 1989). According to this study, strength of evidence had the
strongest effect on whether a prosecutor pursued cases or dropped them. Similarly,
82% of prosecutors would decrease punitive severity in plea bargains if they believed
the evidence against the defendant was weak, and 46%would decrease severity if the
defendants were first-time offenders (Champion, 1989).
Champion’s (1989) findings support Harris and Springer’s (1984) rule of thumb
theory. The study found that prosecutors had a going rate for virtually every kind of
criminal offense (Champion, 1989). Champion also found that defendants with pri-
vate attorneys were less likely to accept the going rate and more likely to get shorter
offers than do defendants with public defenders. Indeed, this study revealed that
defendants who hired private attorneys were more likely to go to trial than defen-
dants represented by public defenders (Champion, 1989).5
McAllister and Bregman (2001) evaluated the responses of role-playing defendants
and role-playing defense attorneys. They found that as the probability of conviction
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increases, both defendants and defense attorneys were more likely to pursue a guilty
plea. Conversely, as sentence severity increased only the defendants were more
receptive to pleading guilty.6 In other words, defendants who faced a potential sen-
tence of more than 5 years were more receptive to a plea bargain, to mitigate their
potential sentence, than defendants who faced a possible sentence of 2 years
(McAllister & Bregman, 2001).
Analysis of Legal and Extra-Legal Variables
In a study to measure the effect of legal and extra-legal variables on the rate of
plea bargains, LaFree (1980) analyzed rape cases and found that plea bargain rates
were affected by evidentiary variables: As the amount of evidence available to the
prosecutor increases, so does the probability of a guilty plea. Similarly, as the
number of witnesses available to the prosecutor increases, so does the probability
of a guilty plea.7 LaFree’s findings are consistent with decision-centered theories
(e.g., Harris & Springer, 1984; Emmelman, 1996), predicting that defendants with
a lower case value are more likely to plead guilty. Similarly, Albonetti (1990) found
that defendants were much more likely to plead guilty where evidence against them
was strong.
Meyer and Gray (1997) evaluated legal and extra-legal factors on guilty plea rates
in drunk driving arraignments, finding that drivers facing more serious charges were
more likely to plead not guilty at arraignment. Although their research did not reflect
the number of defendants who might plead guilty prior to trial, it is consistent with
prior research—recidivists, and those facing longer prison terms, are less likely to
plead guilty (Albonetti, 1990). Additionally, those facing serious charges in lower
courts are less likely to plead guilty (Brickey & Miller, 1975; Mileski, 1971). Meyer
and Gray (1997) found that gender did not affect the decision to plead guilty,
although race did—Caucasians were less likely to plead guilty than minorities. This
finding is similar to those of LaFree (1980).8 Interestingly, the study did not find that
criminal history affected guilty pleas, but the authors point out the likelihood that
this finding was the result of low sample size.9
Albonetti (1990) found that the existence of physical evidence, an increase in the
number of charges, and the defendant’s confession to the crime during police and
prosecutor interrogation increased the probability of a guilty plea. The number of
witnesses, use of a weapon, and offenses carrying a minimum penalty of 5 years
(with no maximum prison term) decreased the probability of a guilty plea.
Recidivists and those facing longer prison sentences were less likely to plead guilty.
The effect of marital status, prior record of felony convictions, type of counsel,
number of charges, and use of a weapon on the probability of a guilty plea varied
according to defendant’s race. When controlling for offense severity, prior record,
presence of physical evidence, eyewitness identification, pretrial release, type of
264 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
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counsel, and whether the defendant confessed, Albonetti (1990) found that black
defendants were less likely than Caucasians to plead guilty in felony cases.
Wooldredge (1989) provides another approach to plea bargain rates. By analyz-
ing guilty pleas (for similar felony charges) in 269 jurisdictions (across seven states),
Wooldredge found a curvilinear relationship between the size of jurisdiction (and
city size) and the rate of felony guilty pleas. The guilty plea rate increases as juris-
diction size increases. The rate increases more gradually as jurisdiction size moves
from small—around 1,000 people—to medium-sized jurisdictions of 50,000 people.
Wooldredge notes the guilty plea rate levels off at the medium-sized jurisdiction
level and remains relatively unchanged as jurisdiction size increases to large. The
same relationship exists between city size and guilty plea rate, although Wooldredge
claims that jurisdiction size is a better predictor of variation than city size. The rela-
tionship between caseload and rate of guilty plea is positive until caseload reaches
600 to 700. At that level, the guilty plea decreases until caseload reaches 1,300 cases
and then the relationship once again becomes positive (Wooldredge, 1989).
In a study focused on white-collar crimes, Albonetti (1998) combined the uncer-
tainty avoidance perspective,10 and an understanding of the legalities of pleading
guilty, to theorize that guilty pleas vary in their worth to prosecuting attorneys because
of an interplay between legality, bureaucratic interests, finality in case processing, and
case complexity. This legal–bureaucratic theory (Albonetti, 1998) suggests that negoti-
ating power shifts from the prosecutor to the defendant in complex white-collar crimes,
allowing the defendant to negotiate a shorter sentence. In this study, an overarching
plan of illegal activity or a high level of organization characterizes case complexity.
These complex white-collar crimes are categorically different from other crime
because of the absence of presumptive evidence of a crime (Albonetti, 1998).
Structural–Contextual Theory
Research conducted prior to this study has been helpful in shaping our understand-
ing of plea bargain rates but lacked the factors that effectively differentiate terrorist
defendants from nonterrorist defendants. Terrorists are treated differently than nonter-
rorists, and prior research has indicated that terrorists are convicted by trial more often
than nonterrorists (Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998). Of the aforementioned studies,
Worden’s (1990) research is unique in that it is focused on the political environment
surrounding plea decisions in separate Georgia court jurisdictions. In contrast, terror-
ists are convicted in federal courts across the nation (Smith & Damphousse, 1996,
1998), and many courts may not docket more than one or two cases in as many years,
making jurisdictional analysis such as Worden’s impractical and unreliable. A theory
that accounts for the political environment that surrounds terrorism cases is necessary.
Focusing on unexplained variances in sentencing, Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti
(1980) advanced the proposition that researchers could predict sentence outcomes
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more accurately for some crimes than others by using structural–contextual theory.
He contends that disparity in sentences for offenses on which the government con-
centrates law enforcement and prosecutorial resources is substantially lower than it
is for crimes escaping such scrutiny. Hagan (1989a, 1989b) hypothesized that stud-
ies of sentence outcomes focusing on crimes that are general in nature, or studies that
do not concentrate on crimes that elicit intense federal response, will result in low
levels of explained variance.
Components of the American criminal justice system tend to be loosely coupled,
which leads to a decrease in explained variance (Hagan, 1989a). Even then, law offi-
cers and prosecutors may have resources to exchange, leading to a tighter coupling
than normal. Structural–contextual theory suggests that when “political power is
directed toward particular crime-linked goals,” the American criminal justice system
and subsystems tighten through the use of proactive techniques (Hagan, 1989a, p.
118). Hagan (1989a) further suggests that it is a proactive political environment that
mandates a departure from normal criminal justice operations and that these depar-
tures involve the imposition of political power that sometimes targets the prosecu-
tion of a particular form of crime and criminal.
Smith and Damphousse (1998) applied structural–contextual theory to their
research on terrorist or nonterrorist offenses. Terrorists convicted under the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Program are representative of offenders who are the focus of a
proactive political environment via the government’s expenditure of resources and
personnel geared toward the terrorists’ arrest and prosecution, similar to Hagan’s
drug and white-collar crime offenders (Smith & Damphousse, 1998). Applying
structural–contextual theory to terrorist or nonterrorist offenses, Smith and Damphousse
(1998) suggest that when
a criminal act is officially designated by the polity as an act of terrorism, that designa-
tion sets in motion proactive law enforcement and prosecutorial techniques with con-
comitant increases in expenditures by law enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial
agencies. (p. 73)
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Table 1
Typology of Explained Variance in Sentence Outcomes
Crime Severity
Proactive Political Environment Low High
Nonterrorist a) Low levels of explained b) Moderate levels of explained 
variance variance
Terrorist c) Moderate levels of explained d) High levels of explained 
variance variance
Source: Reprinted from Smith and Damphousse (1998).
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It follows that one should be able to apply structural–contextual theory to help
explain why terrorist defendants tend to plead guilty much less often than nonter-
rorist defendants. As with disparity in sentence outcomes, the likelihood of prosecu-
torial discretion would diminish in terrorism cases where there exists a proactive
political environment geared toward the apprehension and conviction of terrorist
defendants.
Thus, in the presence of a proactive political environment, prosecutors are less
likely to exercise discretion in cases where the defendant has been identified as hav-
ing committed a terrorism offense. Consequently, terrorists would experience dimin-
ished plea bargain opportunities. As a result, we expect that terrorists will be less
likely to be convicted as a result of a guilty plea than similarly situated nonterrorists.
This hypothesis is tested while controlling traditional variables that are typically
used to explain the likelihood of a conviction by guilty plea.
Methodology
Sample
In the early 1980s, the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center published
an annual report that specified which crimes were investigated under the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Program. At the time, this was the only public record of terrorism
investigations in the United States. In 1989, the FBI released to Brent Smith the
names of persons indicted as a result of these investigations for the period of 1980
through 1988 (Smith, 1994). Staff from the Department of Justice matched the list
of terrorist indictees with federal court docket numbers assigned throughout the
Unites States and Puerto Rico. Demographic and sentencing data were collected in
each of the federal district courts where the trials occurred. The data were also sup-
plemented by information provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts.11 This dataset became known as the American Terrorism Study (ATS) data
(Damphousse & Smith, 2004). The project team continuously added to ATS data
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Table 2
Expected Plea Bargain Rates by Offense Level
Proactive Political 
Environment Low Severity Offense High Severity Offense
No (Nonterrorist) a) Higher likelihood of a conviction b) Moderate likelihood of a conviction 
by guilty plea by guilty plea 
Yes (Terrorist) c) Moderate likelihood of a conviction d) low likelihood of a conviction 
by guilty plea by guilty plea 
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during the years whenever the FBI released a new set of names to the project director.
The terrorists who are examined in this analysis were provided by the FBI in a series
of releases to the ATS project during a series of years and included people who were
convicted as a result of a federal terrorism investigation from 1989 through 2002.
The complete database of people who were indicted as a result of a terrorism database
from 1980 to 2002 included data on more than 500 individuals. Since data collection
after 1998 was incomplete, we limited the terrorist sample to persons who were con-
victed as a result of a terrorism investigation from 1990 to 1998.
The purpose of the current study was to examine the different experiences that
terrorist indictees face during the pretrial phase concerning decisions about plea bar-
gaining compared with similarly situated nonterrorists. To accomplish this task, it
was imperative that we create a comparison group that was as similar as possible to
the terrorists in our database and then to apply the appropriate statistical controls to
allow for such a comparison. Thus, we matched each of the terrorists in our sample
with five traditional offenders (i.e., nonterrorists) whose data were extracted from
the Federal Judicial Center’s Federal Court Cases Integrated Data Base.
Each of the terrorists was matched with all of the nonterrorists by (a) year of
indictment and (b) offense code. Then, we randomly selected a sample of five non-
terrorists who were indicted within the same year and for the same offense code
categories for each of the terrorists, resulting in a 5:1 ratio of nonterrorists to ter-
rorists. If an adequate number of nonterrorists could not be identified in the same
year, persons convicted of the same offense were selected from adjacent years
until the ratio was achieved. We selected a greater number of nonterrorists so that
we could minimize some of the sampling error that would have occurred had we
only matched convicted terrorists and nonterrorists on a 1:1 ratio. Selecting five
nonterrorists will mitigate against the problem of selecting outliers into the non-
terrorist sample.
We excluded 15 cases that involved explicitly politicized offenses (e.g., treason or
sedition and national defense) because it was impossible to match them with nonter-
rorists who were charged with the same offense. In addition, 6 terrorists were con-
victed twice during the time period. Listwise deletion due to missing data resulted in
a data set with 584 federally convicted felons (490 nonterrorists and 94 terrorists).
Although the ATS contains more than 80 variables on each of the terrorists in the
sample, it did not, by definition, contain any data on the nonterrorists in the sample
that we created. Thus, to maintain consistency in measurement and coding, we used
the Federal Sentencing Commission data for all of the analyses reported in the
article.
Variables
The dependent variable in this study is conviction via a trial. The federal sentenc-
ing data provide two categories of conviction type: convicted at trial and convicted
268 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
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by guilty plea. Those who were convicted by trial were coded 1, whereas those who
were convicted via a guilty plea were coded 0.
All participants in this study were coded into the dummy variable called terror-
ist. Individuals who originated in the ATS study were coded 1, whereas persons who
were selected in the matched nonterrorist sample were coded 0. To control for fac-
tors that could affect the likelihood of a plea agreement’s being reached, we also
included the following control variables: number of counts (which reflects the
number of counts that are included in each indictment) and criminal history (a scale
variable that reflects the number of criminal history points that were used in the cal-
culation of the potential penalty range).
To test variables specifically identified in the decision-centered studies, the vari-
ables race, gender, education, and age are included as measures of extralegal factors
on the likelihood of a conviction occurring as a result of a criminal trial. Data on
each of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 3.
Although previous studies have suggested that jurisdiction size is an important con-
sideration in the likelihood of a conviction by guilty plea (Wooldredge, 1989), we did
not include that variable because it was not in the data set. Although this variable could
have been created, we decided not to include it because the majority of federal trials
occur in jurisdictions much larger than 50,000. Because the effect of jurisdiction size
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analyses (N = 584)
Variable n % Range M SD
Conviction type
Convicted by trial 97 16.6
Convicted by guilty plea 487 83.4
Type of defendant
Nonterrorist 490 83.9
Terrorist 94 16.1
Age 18 to 98 35.10 11.00
Minority status
Minority 187 32.0
White 397 68.0
Gender
Male 513 87.8
Female 71 12.2
Education
Less than high school 168 28.8
High school or GED 199 34.1
Some college 172 20.9
College grad 45 7.7
Number of counts in indictment 1 to 50 1.97 3.12
Number of criminal history points 0 to 27 3.00 4.32
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seems to be greatest for jurisdictions between 1,000 and 50,000 people, we did not
believe it would be necessary to include this control variable. In addition, information
on the type of defense counsel (private or public defender) and case value12 (Emmelman,
1996; Harris & Springer, 1984) is available in the ATS data and could have been incor-
porated into this analysis. Unfortunately, the information is not available in the federal
sentencing data and it is therefore not available for the nonterrorists in our sample.
Findings
A bivariate analysis of the data was conducted to assess the difference between
the percentage of terrorists and nonterrorists who were convicted via trial. The
analysis shown in Table 4 reveals that the terrorists in this sample were twice as
likely as nonterrorists to be convicted as a result of criminal trial (29.8% and 14.1%,
respectively). This relationship is significant. It is important to note that the match-
ing process implicitly controls for severity of offense and year of indictment.
Having determined that a relationship exists between type of defendant and how
the conviction was determined, we now move to a multivariate analysis that will
allow us to control for the effect of demographic variables and relevant case infor-
mation that could affect the likelihood of a conviction occurring as a result of a
guilty plea. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous (conviction by guilty
plea = 0, conviction by trial = 1), we test our hypothesis using a logistic regression
model. Our analyses are presented in Table 5. Please keep in mind that the matching
procedure also means that we are controlling for severity of offense and year of
indictment in each of the models presented in the table.
In Model I, we observe the effect of being indicted as a result of a terrorism inves-
tigation. This model effectively replicates the findings presented in Table 4.
Terrorists are more than twice as likely to be convicted as a result of a criminal trial
than nonterrorists (odds ratio = 2.59, sig = .000). This suggests that terrorists are
either less likely to accept a plea bargain offer or are less likely to be offered an offer
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Table 4
Bivariate Comparison of Case Disposition for Terrorists and Nonterrorists
Terrorists Nonterrorists
n % n % N
Convicted by trial 28 29.8 69 14.1 97
Convicted by guilty plea 66 70.2 421 85.9 487
Total 94 490 618
Chi-square = 14.05 (p < .000).
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016ccj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
that they deem to be acceptable. In Model II, we assess the effect that demographic
variables have on this relationship. Of the control variables, only age is statistically
significant—as age of defendant increases, the likelihood of being convicted as a
result of a trial increases (holding other variables constant). For this model, age is
probably acting as a surrogate measure of criminal history and recidivism. This
would be consistent with previous research (Albonetti, 1990). The effect of having
been indicted as a result of a terrorism investigation is still significant after adding
the demographic controls (odds ratio = 2.32, sig = .000). Finally, in Model III, we
add two case-specific variables that could affect the likelihood of a conviction by
guilty plea. There is no significant effect of prior criminal history on the type of case
disposition. On the other hand, there is a significant effect on the number of counts
in the indictment. As the number of counts in the indictment increases, the likelihood
of a conviction resulting from a trial significantly increases. The result is the oppo-
site of Albonetti’s (1990) observation that the number of charges pending against the
defendant indirectly increases the likelihood of a plea bargain. This difference can
probably be explained by the fact that we are controlling for count severity in this
study. As in the previous two models, however, the effect of being indicted as a ter-
rorist is still significant (odds ratio = 2.22, sig= .000).
Conclusion
This research examined the differences among terrorists and nonterrorists regarding
whether they were convicted at trial or by a plea agreement. Traditionally, about 95%
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Table 5
Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting the Likelihood of a
Conviction as a Result of a Trial (N = 584)
Model I Model II Model III
Variables B Odds Ratio B Odds Ratio B Odds Ratio
Terrorist 0.95* 2.59 0.84* 2.32 0.80* 2.22
Age 0.03* 1.03 0.03 1.03
Minority 0.24 1.27 0.13 1.04
Education 0.03 1.03 0.00 1.00
Male 0.23 1.26 0.20 1.02
Criminal history 0.02 1.02
Number of counts 0.13* 1.14
Constant –1.081 –3.260 –3.450
–2 log likelihood 512.8 503.5 488.5
Nagelkerke R2 0.035 0.061 0.103
*p < .000.
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of federal defendants are convicted via a plea agreement. However, results from the cur-
rent research indicate that a substantially larger percentage of terrorists and nonterror-
ists matched by lead offense are more likely to go to trial, and ultimately be convicted
at trial, than among the general population of federal defendants. Nearly 30% of the ter-
rorists and 14% of the nonterrorists were convicted in federal trials. This difference
(30% and 14% compared to 4% to 5% among other federal defendants) suggests that
the charges for which the terrorists were tried (and for which the matched sample was
based on) were substantially more serious than traditional federal defendants.
Importantly, both terrorists and nonterrorists exhibited similar patterns when the
samples were tested separately. Those patterns were largely similar to earlier studies
of plea bargaining (e.g., Albonetti, 1990; Meyer & Gray, 1997), with the exception
of the influence of number of counts, which will be discussed shortly.
Of greatest interest is the finding that the terrorists in this study were twice as
likely to be convicted at trial as nonterrorists (30% compared to 14%, respectively),
indicating that factors other than those identified in decision-centered studies and
studies of traditional legal and extra-legal variables were at work in the terrorist sam-
ple. This difference existed in each of the three models tested, despite controls for
selected demographic and legal variables.
Other than whether the person was designated as a terrorist, only two additional
variables were significant predictors of trial conviction—age and number of counts.
Both of these findings are worthy of comment. Unlike conventional wisdom about
the demographic characteristics of terrorists, persons indicted in federal courts for
terrorism-related activities tend to be considerably older than traditional federal
defendants (Corley, Smith, & Damphousse, 2005). With an average age at indict-
ment of 35 to 40 years, most federally indicted terrorists defy traditional perceptions
about federal defendants and the youthfulness of terrorists. Second, we found that
the greater the number of counts, the more likely a defendant was to be convicted at
trial. This seems contradictory to previous research by Albonetti (1990), who found
that the greater the number of counts, the greater the probability of settlement by
plea agreement. However, it should be noted that conviction at trial and settlement
by plea agreement are not measurements of the same variable. Although the two
should be highly related, their subtle differences apparently affect number of counts
in substantively different ways. This effect is probably related to sample selection—
that the charges for which the sample of terrorists and nonterrorists were indicted
were significantly more serious than typical federal defendants. This notion, how-
ever, that severity of charges affects either the decision to go to trial or the trial out-
come, deserves continued examination for this class of offenders.
Theoretically, structural–contextual theory provides a plausible explanation: Ter-
rorism results in the emergence of a proactive political environment, which coalesces
into a common goal shared by federal investigators and federal prosecutors—the
apprehension, arrest, and conviction of terrorists. Similar to the effect on sentencing
variance (Smith and Damphousse, 1996, 1998), plea bargaining decreases as politi-
cal focus and government resources are shifted to combat terrorism. However, the
272 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
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development of more precise propositions from which to identify testable hypothe-
ses is necessary to further this line of reasoning.
An inherent weakness of this study is the lack of sentencing commission data on
traditional offenders who have been indicted but not convicted. Including that infor-
mation would allow examination of the broader terrorism population contained in
the ATS. This would make possible the analysis of another important factor in this
line of research—acquittal rates. Acquittal rates among terrorists appear to be higher
than among nonterrorists (see Smith, 1994; Smith & Damphousse, 1996; Smith,
Damphousse, Yang, & Ginther, 2005) and logically related to plea bargain or trial
rates. The decision regarding whether to plead guilty or go to trial and, subsequently,
whether one is convicted at trial is the result of a complicated series of interactions
reflecting the ideology of the defendant, the manner in which the defendants desire
to be portrayed in public, and the manner in which the prosecution desires to portray
the defendant before a prospective jury. This area of research is in its infancy and
could be of significant use to prosecutors and public defenders alike.
Appendix
Coding of Count Severity Variable
Federal Administrative Office Code Code for Severity
Treason, sedition 9754 29
Murder, 1st 0100 28
Kidnapping, hostage 7611 27
Racketeering 7400 26
Explosives 994 25
Firearms 7380 24
Robbery, bank 1100 23
Murder, 1st, conspiracy 0101 22
Embezzlement, bankruptcy 4990 21
Counterfeiting 5800 20
Robbery, conspiracy 1400 19
Manslaughter 0300 18
Firearms, machine guns, conspiracy 7800 17
Drugs, cocaine 6701 16
Drugs, distribution marijuana 6501 15
Auto theft 5100 14
Embezzlement, other 4990 13
Theft, bank 3100 12
National defense 9790 11
Racketeering, arson, conspiracy 7410 10
Embezzlement, postal or wire 4700 9
Theft, transportation, conspiracy 3600 8
Escape 7312 7
Aiding escapee 7320 6
(continued)
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Appendix (continued)
Federal Administrative Office Code Code for Severity
Theft, U.S. property, conspiracy 3400 5
Embezzlement, false claims 4991 4
Firearms, possession 7820 3
Contempt 9921 2
Miscellaneous 9999 1
Note: Code for severity: 1 = least severe and 29 = most severe.
Notes
1. Notable exceptions would be those jurisdictions where plea bargaining has been abolished.
2. Sentencing research is included here because studies invariably test the effect of plea bargains on
sentence outcome, and some (e.g., Albonetti, 1998; Kramer & Ulmer, 1996) contain findings that are
salient and should be explored.
3. See McAllister (1990) for a discussion of the impact of eyewitness evidence.
4. See Holmes, Daudistel, and Taggart (1992) for a discussion of the impact of plea bargains on case
disposition, partially refuting findings made in earlier studies.
5. Champion reports that of 2,971 cases in his study that went to trial, only 112 involved defendants
represented by public defenders (1989).
6. For a discussion of plea bargain rates in lower courts being affected adversely by the seriousness
of an offense, see Brickey & Miller (1975) and Mileski (1971).
7. But see Albonetti (1990), who found that an increase in the number of eyewitnesses exerted a neg-
ative effect on pleading guilty.
8. But see Albonetti (1990), whose research reached the opposite conclusion—Black defendants
were less likely to plead guilty than White defendants.
9. Only eight defendants had prior convictions.
10. The uncertainty avoidance perspective suggests that prosecutors will increasingly opt for plea bar-
gaining as their perceived chances of winning a case at trial diminish. This is particularly the case where
defendants are considered a danger to the community. Prosecutors rationalize that it is better to secure
immediate incarceration rather than risking acquittal.
11. After receiving the FBI list, data collection teams visited the federal courthouses and archive facil-
ities to review the identified cases and copy documents. Data gleaned from those documents were then
coded into approximately 80 variables and entered into the American Terrorism Study (ATS) database.
12. Defense motions is a variable that measures the number of defense motions filed in a particular
case. The database from which the terrorist sample is derived, ATS, also contains the type of defense
motions filed (e.g., motions to suppress evidence, etc.).
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